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Media Liability for Physical Injury Resulting from
the Negligent Use of Words*
Dr. M. specializes in the treatment of overweight patients.
He prescribes a diet consisting solely of celery, water, and a
popular brand of vitamin pills. Dr. M. also has published a
book advising anyone more than twenty pounds overweight to
follow the diet faithfully.
Two persons adopted Dr. M.'s diet. Mary T. did so on Dr.
M.'s advice during a visit to his office. Frank J., on the other
hand, simply purchased Dr. M.'s book. After following the rec-
ommended diet for several weeks, both Mary and Frank died.
Autopsies indicated that both died as a result of malnutrition.
Mary and Frank's survivors separately brought suit against
Dr. M. Mary's survivors claimed medical malpractice by Dr. M.
in prescribing the diet, while Frank's survivors alleged negli-
gent use of words by Dr. M. in publishing the book recom-
mending the diet. At both trials expert testimony established
that Dr. M.'s diet failed to meet accepted professional standards
and was a direct cause of death. The trial court held Dr. M. lia-
ble in both cases.
The appeals court affirmed the medical malpractice verdict
in Mary's case. In Frank's case, however, the appeals court
agreed with Dr. M.'s assertion that the first amendment protec-
tion of the freedom of speech barred recovery for negligent use
of words. The court vacated the judgment and remanded for
dismissal of the claim.1
Although the preceding scenario is fictionalized, courts in-
creasingly have been called on to rule on similar claims alleging
* The Minnesota Law Review thanks Professor Donald G. Marshall for
his invaluable guidance and assistance throughout the development and
writing of this Note.
1. Cf. Smith v. Linn, 51 Pa. Commw. 478, 485, 414 A.2d 1106, 1109 (1980)
(dismissing product liability claim of survivors of victim who died after follow-
ing physician's published diet). Several commentators have suggested similar
hypothetical situations. See Linder, When Names Are Not News, They're Neg-
ligence" Media Liability for Personal Injuries Resulting from the Publication
of Accurate Information, 52 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 421, 442 (1984) (publishing new
name and address of former government witness in witness protection pro-
gram); Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204,
211 (1972) (publishing recipe for nerve gas from gasoline, table salt, and urine).
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physical injury caused by the negligent use of words by media2
defendants. 3 The cases have involved both press4 and broad-
cast 5 media. The issues in the cases highlight the tension be-
2. In this Note "media" refers not only to newspapers, radio, television,
and other similar entities, but also to magazine and book publishers and other
communicators who, in similar circumstances, make their expression available
to the public. Although differences in the rights and responsibilities of these
forms of media exist, see, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50
(1978) (broadcasters subject to stricter regulation than other media), the same
general considerations determine the degree of protection.
3. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017, 1018-19 (5th Cir.
1987) (claim that magazine article describing autoerotic asphyxia caused boy's
death), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988); Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (claim that minor's addiction to tele-
vision violence led to shooting death of elderly neighbor); Weirum v. RKO
Gen., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 43-45, 539 P.2d 36, 37-39, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 469-71 (1975)
(minor negligently forced car off road while rushing to win radio contest);
Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 491-92, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 888, 890-91 (1981) (claim that television movie scene of "artificial rape"
caused group of minors to attack and artificially rape young girl), cert denied,
458 U.S. 1108 (1982); Walt Disney Prods. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d
580, 581 (1981) (child injured while attempting to imitate television demonstra-
tion); Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251,253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (publi-
cation of name and address of abduction victim while assailant still at large),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446
A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982) (claim that boy hung himself while imitating television
stunt); see infra notes 93-102, 108-116 and accompanying text.
In a recent case filed in a California district court, the parents of a young
boy and the parents of a four-year-old girl are suing the local telephone com-
pany. Bishop, Access of Young to Telephone Pornography Faces Key Challenge
in West, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1987, § 1, at 26, col. 1. The boy reportedly had
sexual relations with the girl after dialing a "976" number and listening to the
sexually explicit message. Id. Subscribers to these numbers provide a re-
corded message, and callers are billed for each call. See id. Aside from the
telephone company's claim that it is not responsible for the message or result,
see id., the case may raise many of the issues analyzed in this Note. The tele-
phone company and the provider of the message may be considered media
within the meaning used here. See supra note 2.
A district court recently denied a motion to dismiss by a defendant maga-
zine sued after it published an advertisement for a mercenary. Eiman v. Sol-
dier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988). The
mercenary allegedly killed the plaintiff's daughter after answering the ad. Id.
at 865. The court reasoned that the ad was commercial speech and entitled to
less protection. Id. In the ensuing trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff a total
of $9.4 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Belkin, Magazine is
Ordered to Pay 9.4 Million for Killer's Ad, N.Y. Times, March 4, 1988, at A12,
col. 6.
4. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1018 (magazine); Hyde, 637 S.W.2d at 253
(newspaper).
5. Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 200 (television); Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 43, 539
P.2d at 37-38, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 469-70 (radio); Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 490,
178 Cal. Rptr. at 890 (television); Shannon, 247 Ga. at 402, 276 S.E.2d at 581
(television); DeFilippo, 446 A.2d at 1037 (television).
1194 [Vol. 72:1193
1988] NEGLIGENCE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1195
tween the state interest in protecting the health and safety of
individuals6 and the interest in protecting freedom of speech.7
Courts have not dealt adequately with this tension and have
not resolved satisfactorily the issues arising in these cases.8
This Note examines whether compensation for physical in-
jury caused by negligent use of words is permissible or advisa-
ble under the first amendment. Part I summarizes the general
principles of tort negligence theory and the competing first
amendment interests in protecting free speech. Part II ana-
lyzes the two approaches that lower courts take in cases involv-
ing physical injury caused by negligent use of words. Part III
argues that a precisely applied policy allowing recovery in neg-
ligence in some cases would not be inconsistent with the first
amendment because the requirements of a successful cause of
action in negligence will protect the interests of free speech.
The Note proposes that courts abandon the two approaches cur-
rently taken in such cases and instead apply traditional negli-
gence principles, incorporating first amendment interests into
the analysis of the duty element of a negligence claim. The
Note concludes that adopting the suggested approach would
lead to more just results while providing protection for the in-
terests of free speech.
6. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 25,
430 U.S. 290, 302-03 (1977) (substantial state interest in protecting citizens from
physical injury); Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842, 870 (N.D. Ohio 1978) ('"The
state's interest in protecting the safety and welfare of its citizens cannot be
challenged."). One court has held that the state interest in protecting the lives
and health of its citizens outweighs the due process clause. See Mattis v.
Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1018-19 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated on procedural grounds,
431 U.S. 171 (1977).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115
(1943) (protection of speech in preferred position compared to other constitu-
tional protections).
8. See infra notes 90-146 and accompanying text. The United States
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on a negligence claim involving physical in-
jury that resulted from speech. The Court has denied certiorari in three such
cases. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (mag-
azine article not incitement), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988); Olivia N. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981) (first
amendment bars negligence claim), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982); Hyde v.
City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (ordering trial on negli-
gence claim), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
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I. NEGLIGENCE THEORY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
A. NEGLIGENCE AS A CAUSE OF ACTION
The common law tort of negligence is one means by which
states advance their interest in protecting the physical safety of
citizens and compensating individuals harmed through the fault
of another.9 Negligence arises from conduct falling below legal
standards established to protect others from unreasonable risk
of harm.10 To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must
plead and prove four elements: duty, breach, causation, and in-
jury." Duty consists of the defendant's obligation to conform
to a particular standard of conduct,12 ordinarily that of a rea-
sonable person in like circumstances.13 Breach occurs when the
defendant's conduct falls below the standard and creates a fore-
seeable and unreasonable risk of harm.14 A risk is unreasona-
ble if its magnitude outweighs the utility surrounding the
actor's conduct.15 Causation consists of both cause-in-fact and
9. See supra note 6; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282
(1963). See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 1-7 (1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEE.
TON] (outlining history and policy of tort law, including negligence). The state
interest in protecting citizens and compensating for injuries is so important
that at least one court has held that the safety of bystanders outweighed a sus-
pected criminal's due process right to life. See Mattis, 547 F.2d at 1019.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1963); see PROSSER & KEE-
TON, supra note 9, § 31 (defining negligence as conduct creating unreasonable
risk). Negligence does not necessarily imply lack of due care or an absence of
solicitude for others. Id.
11. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, § 30, at 164-65; see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1963).
12. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, § 30, at 164; id. § 53.
13. Id. § 31. Even reasonable people may act in ways that create risk if a
goal is worth the risk. Id. at 171. Moreover, conduct may be reasonable in one
context but not another. Id. For example, a reasonable person may rush into a
train's path to save a child, but not a hat. Id.
14. See id. at 169 (negligence is conduct that actor should recognize as cre-
ating risk to others).
15. The magnitude of the risk is determined by the legally recognized
value of the invaded interest, the probability of invasion, the likely extent of
harm, and the number of persons whose interests may be invaded. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 293 (1963).
The utility of the conduct is determined by the legally recognized social
value of the interest advanced or protected by the act, the probability that the
interest will be protected, the probability that less dangerous alternatives will
protect the interest, and the cost of the alternatives. See id. § 292. Some con-
duct may be of sufficient social value that courts consider it reasonable even in
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proximate cause.16 Cause-in-fact may be determined by either
a "but-for" standard 17 or a less restrictive "substantial factor"
standard.18 Proximate or legal cause limits liability for practi-
cal or social policy reasons.19 For example, passage of time20 or
other attenuating circumstances 21 may preclude recovery. In
light of nearly certain serious harm. See id. § 292 comment a (operation of
railroads and utilities).
The existence of a duty is a legal issue to be determined only by the court.
PROSSER & KEEroN, supra note 9, § 37, at 236-37. Breach of duty is a factual
issue for the jury. Id. Courts may determine that because of the combination
of the utility of the conduct and the risk of harm, the actor has a duty to warn
of the dangerous conduct or how to avoid injury. See Balder v. Haley, 399
N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 1987).
16. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, § 30, at 165.
17. To decide that the conduct was a but-for cause of the harm, the jury
must compare what actually occurred with what probably would have oc-
curred absent the allegedly negligent conduct. Id. § 41, at 265. But-for causa-
tion, therefore, is not precisely determinable because hypothetical facts must
be assumed. See id.
18. The substantial factor test alleviates the harsh effect of a plaintiff be-
ing unable to recover when two competing causes, either sufficient to bring
about the harm, combine to create a risk, as, for example, when two speeding
cars both strike a pedestrian. Id. § 41, at 268. The substantial factor test also
eliminates liability for acts with inconsequential effects, as, for example,
throwing a lighted match on a forest fire. Id. at 267-68.
19. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.E. 99, 103
(1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (proximate cause not logic, but practical public
policy; out of sense of justice, series of events not traced past certain point).
20. See, e.g., City of Brady v. Finklea, 400 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1968)
(time lapse considered); Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 468-70, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 401, 403 (1969) (house built 18 years before damage).
21. See In re Kinsman Transit Co. (Kinsman 1), 338 F.2d 708, 711-13 (2d
Cir. 1964) (ship caused great damage after breaking loose from moorings); In
re Kinsman Transit Co. (Kinsman 1), 388 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir. 1968) (court
refused damages to grain companies because claims too remote). These cases
involved a remarkable series of events occurring when the weight of ice
against a ship broke it loose from its moorings, sending it drifting downstream.
Kinsman I, 338 F.2d at 711-13; Kinsman II, 388 F.2d at 822-23. In Kinsman I
the court allowed recovery by plaintiffs whose property was damaged by the
string of events, ruling that the exact developments need not be foreseeable.
Kinsman I, 338 F.2d at 725. In Kinsman II the same court denied recovery for
storage expenses and replacement costs resulting from the inability to move
cargo upriver, finding such damages too tenuous. Kinsman II, 388 F.2d at 825.
Some courts have considered proximate cause in terms of foreseeability of
harm, thereby subsuming the issue into the duty and breach analysis. See Pal-
sgra-f, 248 N.Y. at 344, 162 N.E. at 100 ('"The risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation .... "). The plaintiff
was standing on a railroad platform waiting for a train. Id. at 342, 162 N.E. at
99. Another passenger, some distance away, was rushing to catch a train, and a
railroad employee gave him a push to assist him. Id. The passenger dropped a
package containing explosives which exploded. Id. The resulting concussion
tipped over a set of scales which hit the plaintiff. Id. The court held that the
defendant owed the plaintiff no duty because harm to the plaintiff from the
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sum, if a causal connection exists between the breach of a duty
and a measurable, compensable injury, the defendant may be li-
able in negligence.22
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS OF SPEECH
AND THE PRESS
Even if a plaintiff successfully establishes the four ele-
ments of negligence,23 the competing first amendment interest
of protecting free expression may bar recovery against a media
conduct was not foreseeable. Id. at 342, 162 N.E. at 99-100. For a critical analy-
sis of the Palsgraf court's description of the facts and reasoning, see J. NOO-
NAN, PERSON1S AND MASKS OF THE LAw 111-51 (1976).
Most courts hold that proximate cause is a legal issue for the court to de-
termine. See, e.g., Pan Am. Bank v. Osgood, 383 So. 2d 1095, 1100 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (court determines proximate cause); Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
Co. v. Daniels, 8 Ga. App. 775, 779, 70 S.E. 203, 205 (1911) (same). But see Cline
v. Watkins, 66 Cal. App. 3d 174, 186, 135 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (1977) (jury issue).
Whether the judge or jury decides proximate cause issues will depend upon
how the term is defined. See PROSSER & KEETON, SuPxm note 9, § 42, at 274-80.
The jury will determine proximate cause when defined in terms of foreseeabil-
ity, but the court will decide proximate cause issues defined as a duty or other
policy question. Id. These discrepancies reflect the confusion surrounding the
term proximate cause. Id. § 43, at 273-74.
22. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Traditionally, plaintiffs
could not recover if more than one wrongdoer caused the harm, see Knell v.
Feltman, 174 F.2d 662, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (citing Merryweather v. Nixan, 101
Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799)), or if the plaintiff's negligence was an intervening
or concurrent cause, see Logullo v. Joannides, 301 F. Supp. 722, 723-24 (D. Del.
1969) (driving on wrong side of road); Brown v. Derry, 10 Wash. App. 459, 460-
61, 518 P.2d 251, 252 (1974) (riding on outside of car). Most jurisdictions have
alleviated these harsh results through concepts of contribution from joint
tortfeasors. Knell, 174 F.2d at 666; Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill. 2d 84, 87-89, 302
N.E.2d 40, 43-44 (1973). States have also adopted comparative negligence poli-
cies when the plaintiff's negligence contributes to the harm. See generally
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, §§ 65-67, at 451-75 (general discussion of
contributory negligence, last clear chance, and comparative negligence). Pure
comparative negligence systems reduce compensation by whatever percentage
of fault is attributed to the plaintiff, while modified comparative negligence al-
lows plaintiffs to recover only if their negligence is not greater than or, in
some jurisdictions, only if it is less than that of the defendants. Id. § 67, at 471-
74. Some states have adopted comparative negligence by statute. See, e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-64-122 (1987) (comparative fault provision); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-111 (1987) (comparative negligence as measure of damages);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972) (contributory damages no bar to recovery,
jury may diminish damages). Others have adopted the policy judicially. See,
e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 810, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 862 (1975) ("all-or-nothing" rule of contributory negligence superseded by
a rule which assesses liability in proportion to fault); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.
2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973) (recovery proportional to amount of negligence).
23. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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defendant. The first amendment 24 prohibits governmental ac-
tion abridging freedom of speech or the press.s Determining
the limits of first amendment protection requires consideration
of the amendment's underlying principles and depends on the
approach used to analyze conflicting interests.
1. Underlying Principles of the Protection of Speech
The United States Supreme Court and commentators have
identified several interests protected by first amendment free-
dom of speech. The first amendment provides a check on gov-
ernmental tyranny by encouraging unrestricted criticism.26
Such criticism is especially important in a system of democratic
self-government.27 Free speech also insures a "marketplace of
ideas,"28 in which the competition of freely expressed ideas will
24. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press .... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
25. Freedom of the press and free speech have different origins. See An-
derson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 466-67 (1983)
(freedom of press protected by state constitutions long before federal bill of
rights considered). Freedom of the press includes rights such as media access
to courts, public records, and sessions of political bodies not encompassed by
free speech. Because this Note concerns the media as communicating entities,
rather than as news gathering agencies or as actors in other capacities, the
terms free speech, free press, and free expression will be functionally
equivalent.
The first amendment applies to the states by incorporation through the
fourteenth amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
(fourteenth amendment due process clause protects first amendment rights
from state impairment).
26. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (framers amended Constitution because they recognized dangers
of tyranny by majority over minority); see also Richmond Newspapers v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (first
amendment has "structural role to play in securing and fostering our republi-
can system of self-government") (emphasis in original); Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153, 185 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) ("And the Amendment
shields those who would censure the state or expose its abuses."); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (freedom of speech is the es-
sence of self-government) (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75
(1969)).
27. The Supreme Court has often noted that self-government is impossi-
ble without the free flow of information and the ability to criticize. See cases
cited suzpra note 26.
28. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting) ("[The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market .... ."). The checking value in self-
government and the marketplace of ideas concept are sometimes grouped to-
gether in the more general principle of enlightenment. See M. NIMMER, NIM-
MEM ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT § 1.02, at 10-20, 44-48 (1984).
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aid people in determining what is true. In addition, free speech
promotes self-fulfillment and self-expression. 29 The interests
in maintaining a marketplace of ideas and encouraging self-ful-
fillment extend to scientific and artistic expression as well as to
governmental and political criticism.30 Finally, free speech
serves as a safety valve for society, reducing the possibility of
more destructive exhibitions of dissatisfaction.3' The degree to
which a particular instance of speech advances these or other
court-identified interests determines the amount of protection
that the speech receives.32
First amendment protection, however, is not absolute, be-
cause competing societal interests may outweigh the interest in
protecting free speech.33 The problem of where and how to
draw the line between these competing interests has been diffi-
cult,34 and the Supreme Court has often varied its approach
and its placement of the line.3s
29. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Mhe final
end of the State [is] to make men free to develop their faculties .... [L]iberty
[is] both ... an end and . .. a means."); see also Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.2 (1980) (first amendment "protects
the individual's interest in self-expression"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
24 (1971) (first amendment protections important to individual dignity and
choice).
30. See 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.6, at 15-16 & n.12 (1986).
31. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[Tihe path
of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances ....
Fear of serious injury [to the social order] cannot alone justify suppression of
free speech .... Men feared witches and burnt women."); see also Milk
Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmorr Dairies, 312 U.S.
287, 293 (1941) (free speech averts "force and explosions").
32. See 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 30, § 20.6, at 13-
17. Inherent in the first amendment protections is also the "freedom to hear."
See id. (first amendment prevents government suppression of certain speech
thus allowing citizens to hear criticism and unpopular ideas); see also Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 77 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Mhe
central First Amendment concern remains the need to maintain free access of
the public to the expression.") (emphasis added); Columbia Broadcasting Sys.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) (viewers have right of ac-
cess to social, esthetic, and moral ideas and expression) (citing Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
33. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (no right to
yell "Fire!" in crowded theater); infra notes 36-82 and accompanying text.
34. Judge Learned Hand framed the problem eloquently 'What sancti-
fied ritualistic phrase shall fix the place where discussion ends and words may
ex cathedra be said to have no power to enlighten?" Letter from Learned
Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Jan. 2, 1921), reprinted in Gunther, Learned
Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Frag-
ments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 770 (1975).
35. The Court's handling of advocacy or incitement of illegal activity, see
[Vol. 72:11931200
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2. Limitations on the Freedom of Speech
Courts attempting to resolve the conflict between the in-
terests of free speech and other societal interests generally
choose among three approaches. One approach is to declare
that the first amendment protections are absolute and to pro-
hibit all government restrictions on speech.36
Another approach involves case-by-case, ad hoc balancing
of the competing interests.37 Ad hoc balancing requires consid-
eration of the total circumstances of each case, weighing the
plaintiff's interests against those of the defendant.38 The
Supreme Court has adopted and encouraged this approach in
various instances.39
Finally, a court may adopt a categorical approach in defin-
ing the limits of first amendment protection. Recently, the
Supreme Court has adopted this approach and discouraged ad
hoc balancing.40 A court employing the categorical approach
identifies certain categories of speech as being outside of the
first amendment's coverage, and therefore unprotected, because
the threatened societal interests outweigh the interest in pro-
tecting the particular type of speech.41 States may regulate un-
infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text, and defamation, see infra notes 59-78
and accompanying text, illustrate the ongoing difficulties in line drawing.
36. Justice Black professed to hold this view, stating that the first amend-
ment means literally what it says "without any 'ifs' or 'buts' or 'whereases.'"
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). Never-
thless, Justice Black wrote opinions that would allow some restrictions. For
example, in his dissent in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), in which the
Court refused to allow prosecution for wearing a jacket with an arguably ob-
scene and offensive message, id. at 26, Justice Black argued that wearing the
message on the jacket was conduct, not speech. Id. at 27. Professor Melville
Nimmer claims that those holding the absolutist position use conduct as a code
word for speech that they find to be undeserving of first amendment protec-
tions. M. NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.01, at 7.
37. See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399
(1950) (court's duty is to determine which of two conflicting interests demands
greater protection).
38. Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) ("Where First
Amendment rights are asserted ... resolution of the issue always involves a
balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake
in the particular circumstances shown.").
39. See cases cited supra notes 37-38.
40. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-44, 346 (1974) (ad hoc
balancing in first amendment litigation not feasible; unwise to commit task to
judges).
41. Societal interests in maintaining peace and order, for example, out-
weigh the interest of protecting the freedom of speech when the speech is in-
citement. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curiam);
see infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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protected speech through either criminal42 or civil 43 penalties,
if the regulation is precisely defined44 and narrowly applied.45
Vague or overbroad regulations violate the Constitution be-
cause they may punish protected speech or act as prior re-
straints47 through their chilling effect.48
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed negligent
use of words in physical injury cases, some lower courts have
analyzed such cases using the Court's categorical approach.
Lower courts have applied principles of incitement,49 an unpro-
tected category of speech, to negligent use of words cases,sa and,
although not specifically applying defamation law, have relied
on language from defamation cases.5 1 Defamation and invasion
of privacy, both unprotected categories of speech, provide use-
42. States may impose criminal sanctions if the speech is incitement. See
infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
43. States may impose civil liability for defamation and invasion of pri-
vacy. See infra notes 59-82 and accompanying text.
44. An imprecise or vague regulation does not give a clear definition of
the regulation's limits. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 383 (1979).
45. Courts will strike down regulations that are not narrowly applied be-
cause an overbroad regulation may reach speech that the state is not entitled
to regulate. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
46. Even protected speech may be regulated in some ways. For example,
states may restrict time, place, and manner if the restrictions are not directed
at suppressing speech, they further an important or substantial governmental
interest, and any incidental regulation of speech is no greater than necessary
to further the government interest. United States v. O'Brien 391 U.S. 367, 379
(1968). If the governmental regulation impinges upon basic first amendment
rights, the burden is on the government to show the absence of less intrusive
alternatives. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, 452 U.S. 640, 658 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
47. The Supreme Court has characterized the avoidance of prior restraints
on speech as the first amendment's most important safeguard. See Patterson
v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (main purpose of first amendment to pre-
vent previous restraints). The Court more recently has expanded the scope of
the amendments protection beyond prior restraints. See Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101 (1979). Nonetheless, the Court continues to
emphasize that avoiding prior restraints is the "chief purpose" of the first
amendment. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 n.25 (1979). For a
more complete discussion of these cases and the prior restraint doctrine, see
M. NnME., supra note 28, § 4.02.
48. Regulations that are overbroad or vague carry the danger that they
will act as prior restraint through self-censorship. Cf. Village of Hoffman Es-
tate v. The Flipside Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497-99 (1982) (uphold-
ing statute, although vague, because speech will not be deterred).
49. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 107-23 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 124-37 and accompanying text.
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ful analogues in a discussion of cases involving physical injury
caused by negligent use of words5 2 and demonstrate the Court's
willingness and the need, in some situations, to balance inter-
ests on an ad hoc basis.53
a. Incitement
Recognizing the compelling state interest in maintaining
order and public safety, the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v.
Ohio1 identified incitement as a category of unprotected
speech. 55 Incitement is speech directed toward and likely to
produce violent or lawless conduct.1 Under the Brandenburg
incitement standard, the speaker must intend to produce the
activity57 and there must be a likelihood of imminent lawless
activity.5 8
52. See infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 61-82 and accompanying text. The Court has identified
several other categories of speech as unprotected by the first amendment. Ob-
scenity, although difficult to identify, is unprotected. See Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Court's opinion in Miller summarizes the evolution of
this difficult and troubling area of constitutional law. In addition, the first
amendment does not protect fighting words. See Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Since Chaplinsky the Court has reversed sev-
eral convictions for uttering fighting words on the grounds of vagueness or
overbreadth. See, ag., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Good-
ing v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). On vagueness and overbreadth, see supra
notes 42-48 and accompanying text. The Gooding and Lewis decisions leave
open the question whether the fighting words doctrine, which allows regula-
tion of speech likely to cause hostile reaction, is still good law. See 3 R. RO-
TUNDA, J. NowAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 30, § 20.40, at 198.
Commercial speech, although not strictly an unprotected category of
speech, does not enjoy the same protection as noncommercial speech. Me-
tromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 505-07 (1981) (commercial speech
not entitled to stringent protection afforded core speech); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 69-73 (1976) (same).
54. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). In Brandenburg the defendant was
convicted of violating the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act, which imposed a
criminal penalty for advocacy of lawless activity. Id. at 444-45. The Court re-
versed, distinguishing between advocacy and incitement, and held that mere
advocacy could not be criminally punished. Id. at 447-49. States can punish
only acts that constitute incitement by being directed toward and likely to pro-
duce lawless activity.
55. Id. at 447.
56. Id. In Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973), the Court refined the Bran-
denburg test to require intent to incite and likelihood of imminent violent or
lawless activity. Id. at 108-09 (Indiana disorderly conduct statute which led to
arrest of antiwar demonstrator violated demonstrator's free speech right;
speech was not incitement).
57. Id.
58. Id. The Brandenburg test replaced the clear and present danger stan-
dard. See Schenck v, United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Whitney v.
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b. Defamation
The Supreme Court has also identified defamation as a cat-
egory of unprotected speech, recognizing the state interest in
protecting citizens' reputations.59 Defamation is the publication
of false information damaging to a person's reputation.60
The Court, however, has departed from the strict categori-
cal approach in defamation suits. In a line of cases beginning
with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,61 the Court balanced var-
ious interests to determine whether the defendants' degree of
fault rose to the constitutional level required to impose liabil-
ity. The weight afforded to the interest of protecting the indi-
vidual's reputation varied depending on whether the injured
person was a public official,62 public figure,63 or private figure.64
The Court also gave differing weight to the interest of protect-
ing speech, depending on whether the speech was of public con-
cern65 or was private in nature.66
Under the Court's approach in defamation cases, the stan-
dard of liability depends on the balance of free speech interests
and reputational interests. The state interest in protecting
speech critical of government and its officials is compelling
California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The clear and
present danger standard allowed a state to regulate or punish speech when the
speech presented the imminent danger that violent or lawless activity would
result from it. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507-10 (1951), which
adopted a balancing test, greatly eroded the clear and present danger analysis.
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. Brandenburg completed the process. Id.
Despite Brandenburg, some courts continue to use the clear and present dan-
ger language. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 404, 276
S.E.2d 580, 582 (1981) (broadcast did not present clear and present danger to
child).
59. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
60. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
61. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). New York Times involved a suit by a Montgom-
ery, Alabama, city commissioner who sued the newspaper and others after an
ad was published that contained some inaccuracies. Id. Civil rights organizers
had placed the ad to gain support for their efforts. Id. at 256-57. The Court
held that higher standards of fault are required to protect speech critical of
public officials in their official capacity. Id. at 264.
62. Id.
63. Public figures do not hold official positions in government, but are so
situated that comments on their public activities are per se matters of public
concern. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967)
(university athletic director employed by private corporation is public figure).
64. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (involvement in public issues does not by it-
self raise individual to level of public figure).
65. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454
(1976) (issue is whether speech is of public concern).
66. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 453-54; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
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compared to the reputational interest of a public official.67
Consequently, public official plaintiffs must prove that the de-
fendant acted with actual malice in uttering or publishing a de-
famatory statement critical of the plaintiffs in their official
role.68 The state's interest in protecting the reputation of pub-
lic figures is higher than that of protecting public officials' rep-
utations.69 In cases involving public figures, the standard of
liability differs depending on whether the subject matter of the
speech was of public concern.70 Thus, the value of the speech is
weighed against the reputational interest of the plaintiffs. If
the speech was of public concern, public figure plaintiffs must
prove actual malice.71 If the speech was not of public concern,
the standard of fault is negligence.72
The state interest in protecting reputation is greatest for
private figure plaintiffs.73 Moreover, the state interest in pro-
tecting the speech is lower because speech regarding private
figures less significantly implicates the underlying interests of
the first amendment.74 Because of the higher interest in repu-
tation and the lower interest in speech, private figure plaintiffs
need only prove that the defendant was negligent in publishing
the defamatory statement,75 even if the general subject matter
was of public concern.76
Damages in defamation cases may be presumed if the re-
quired standard of fault, either actual malice or negligence, is
proven.77 This is true whether the plaintiff is a public official,
public figure, or private figure.78
67. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269-71.
68. Id. at 279-80. Actual malice is defined as the making of a statement
with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard for its truth or
falsity. Id. The Court later defined reckless disregard to mean acting with se-
rious doubt as to the truth of the defamatory statement. See St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).




73. Id. at 343.
74. Id.
75. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
Rodney Smolla argues that Dun & Bradstreet may open the door for strict lia-
bility in cases involving private figure plaintiffs when the speech is not of pub-
lic concern. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3.02 (1986).
76. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 337.
77. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757-61.
78. Id.
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c. Invasion of Privacy
The Supreme Court has recognized the interest in protect-
ing privacy 79 by classifying the tort of invasion of privacy by
publication of private facts as unprotected speech.8 0 The tort
requires proof of three elements: the facts must be publicly dis-
closed, they must be truly private facts, and disclosure must be
offensive to a reasonable person of normal sensibilities.8 ' De-
termination of these elements necessarily requires case-by-case
balancing of first amendment interests against those of the
plaintiffs.82
79. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 75, § 10.01; Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383 (1960).
80. Cf Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487-97 (1975) (stat-
ute prohibiting public disclosure of rape victim's name violates first amend-
ment when name already in public records). Invasion of privacy includes
three other interrelated torts. See R. SmiOLLA, supra note 75, § 10.01; Prosser,
supra note 79, at 389. False light invasion of privacy, a tort similar to defama-
tion and requiring almost identical analyses, occurs when speech that does not
rise to the level of defamation places the plaintiff in a false light in the eyes of
the public. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In Hill, the Court disallowed the inva-
sion of privacy claim on the basis that the reported information was of public
interest. 385 U.S. at 387-88; see R. SMOLLA, supra note 75, § 10.02.
Intrusion is an invasion of privacy involving methods of gaining informa-
tion, such as eavesdropping or window peeping, and thus does not directly im-
plicate the first amendment interests addressed in this Note. See
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). For a general discussion of
the tort of intrusion, see R. SMOLLA, supra note 75, § 10.03.
Appropriation is the invasion of the right of publication and involves ex-
ploitation of the plaintiff's name, likeness, or other unique property, usually
for commercial gain. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977) (first amendment does not give television station right
to broadcast stuntman's performance).
81. R. SMOLLA, supra note 75, § 10.04[1]; see also Cox Broadcasting, 420
U.S. at 494-95 (disallowing claim of murdered rape victim's father because pub-
lished information was public record). The public interest defense in invasion
of privacy is much broader than the public concern standard in defamation.
See R. SMOLLA, supra note 75, § 10.04[2][b][ii] and cases cited therein. A de-
fendant in a privacy case may bootstrap itself into the defense, making the
subject matter an issue of public interest by its publication, unlike defamation.
Id. Invasion of privacy defenses turn on the newsworthiness of the published
information, as distinguished from the public concern of defamation. Id. An
item apparently may be newsworthy without rising to the level of public con-
cern that would provide a defense against defamation of a public figure. Id.
Because publication of facts may make them newsworthy and therefore not
truly private, invasion of privacy by publication of private facts, although rec-
ognized as unprotected, may be nearly impossible for a plaintiff to prove. Id.
The history of the tort in recent years indicates that it may no longer be good
law. Id.
82. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. Determination of the
private nature of the fact published requires an analysis of the interests ad-
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Thus, the Supreme Court has identified incitement, defa-
mation, and invasion of privacy as unprotected categories of
speech because the state interests threatened by these types of
speech outweigh the first amendment interests. In cases of def-
amation and invasion of privacy, the Court determines stan-
dards of liability by a case-by-case, ad hoc balancing of the
particular interests.
C. THE TENSION BETWEEN NEGLiGENCE THEORY AND THE
FIRST AmENDMENT
When a plaintiff is physically injured as a result of the neg-
ligent use of words, a conflict arises between the interests pro-
tected by negligence theory and the interests underlying first
amendment protection of speech.8s When speech damages a
plaintiff's reputation or invades the plaintiff's privacy, courts
balance the state interest in protecting the individual against
the competing first amendment interests.84 When the speech
physically injures the plaintiff, however, courts do not apply a
similar analysis.as
Lower courts cannot classify negligent use of words as an
unprotected category of speech because the determination of
negligence requires an ad hoc balancing of the competing inter-
ests.8 6 Courts determine the existence of a duty only by con-
cluding that the plaintiff's interests outweigh those of the
defendant in the particular circumstances of the case. 7 On the
other hand, courts determine that speech is incitement, for ex-
ample, by examining the nature of the speech itself and decid-
ing whether it is included in the unprotected category
regardless of the specific interests threatened or the interests of
the speaker.m The inability to categorize negligent use of
vanced by publication. Similarly, determination of whether a reasonable per-
son would be offended requires an ad hoc determination of the particular
nature of the speech and the interest invaded.
83. See supra notes 9, 26-32 and accompanying text. The state interest in
protecting its citizens' health and safety is substantial. See supra note 6.
84. See supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
85. This Note proposes that courts adopt this analysis. See infra notes
165-197 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. Both incitement and
defamation, see supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text, may be identified
apart from any analysis of the plaintiffs' interests. The courts use balancing in
defamation cases not to decide whether the speech is defamation, but rather to
determine whether the required standard of fault exists. If the standard is not
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words as unprotected speech, along with the lack of Supreme
Court precedent, 9 has led to inconsistent standards in lower
court decisions involving physical injury caused by negligent
use of words.
II. NEGLIGENCE, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND
MEDIA DEFENDANTS IN THE LOWER COURTS
The lower courts have used two approaches to decide
whether to allow recovery by a physically injured plaintiff
against a media defendant for negligent use of words. Courts
applying the harm-oriented approach analyze the issue in terms
of negligence and harm,9° giving only minimal attention to po-
tential first amendment conflicts. Courts applying the categori-
met, the speech is still defamatory, but the defendant will not be liable. In
negligence, if the interest of the plaintiff does not outweigh that of the defend-
ant, no negligence exists even in the face of severe personal injury. Thus,
courts do balance interests in defamation, but for different reasons than in
negligence cases.
Some commentators have called the balancing in defamation cases defini-
tional balancing. See, e.g., M. NnmER, supra note 28, § 2.03; Schlag, An Attack
on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 673-74
(1983). Nimmer argues that in definitional balancing, the free speech interest
generally, not just in the specific speech at issue, is weighed against the plain-
tiff's interests. See M. NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.03. Pierre Schlag says that
in definitional balancing, the courts weigh the plaintiff's interest against the
category of speech. See Schlag, supra, at 673-74. Identifying a definitional ap-
proach may have some value as a functional approach to the reasoning of
courts, but it adds little to policy considerations involved in first amendment
and physical injury cases. Regardless of the label attached to a court's ap-
proach to defamation cases, it must weigh the specific interest in protecting
the speech involved against the plaintiffs' interests. See supra notes 59-78 and
accompanying text. The converse of Schlag's claim that the categorical ap-
proach is absolute once the category has been identified is true if courts disal-
low regulation when unable to identify a category. See infra notes 107-46 and
accompanying text.
89. The Court has denied certiorari in three such cases. See Herceg v.
Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 1219
(1988); Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 888 (1981), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982); Hyde v. City of Columbia,
637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983). See
supra note 8.
90. See infra notes 93-104 and accompanying text. This Note uses the
term harm-oriented to distinguish this approach from the one suggested in
text accompanying notes 165-97. The courts using the harm-oriented approach
have failed to consider in depth the conflicting interests and have not ex-
plained how they balance these interests in enough detail to assure that the
elements of negligence were actually met. See supra notes 11-22 and accompa-
nying text. The courts largely omit considerations of first amendment inter-
ests and the value of the speech in their analysis.
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cal approach 9' analyze the issue in terms of unprotected
categories of speech,92 giving only minimal attention to the in-
terest of protecting individuals' health and safety. Neither of
these approaches satisfactorily addresses the issues arising in
these cases. The harm-oriented approach fails to give proper
consideration to first amendment interests. The categorical ap-
proach fails to give proper consideration to the state interest,
reflected in negligence law, of protecting individuals from and
compensating them for physical injury.
A. DEFICIENCIES OF THE HARM-ORIENTED APPROACH
Some courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover damages for
physical harm resulting from negligent use of words.93
Although these courts have mentioned the first amendment
protection of free speech, their superficial treatment of the first
amendment issue has failed to insure the proper protection of
speech in future cases.
In Weirum v. RKO General,94 the defendant radio station
sponsored a promotional campaign in which a disc jockey drove
around giving clues to his location.95 Plaintiff's decedent was
killed by two drivers attempting to win a prize by reaching the
disc jockey first.96 The court allowed recovery in negligence,
91. See infra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 40-53 and accompanying text.
93. One court has denied recovery using primarily a negligence analysis.
Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 202-06 (S.D. Fla.
1979). The plaintiff in Zamora claimed that repeated broadcasts of violent
programs caused him to become subliminally intoxicated with and desensitized
to violence, leading him to kill his eighty-three-year-old neighbor. Id. at 200.
Although the court stated that the first amendment barred the claim, it fo-
cused mainly on the plaintiff's inability to state a specific breach of duty or to
allege a duty at all. Id. at 202-06. Imposing liability, the court said, would be
"awesome to consider," id. at 202, and "give birth to a legal morass," id. at 206.
Because a successful claim in negligence requires that the plaintiff prove all
four elements of the cause of action, see supra note 11 and accompanying text,
the Zamora court properly dismissed the claim. See Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at
206.
94. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
95. Id. at 44-45, 539 P.2d at 38, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 470. The radio station
aimed its programming primarily at teenagers and was seeking to increase its
market share with a $40,000 campaign. Id. at 4344, 539 P.2d at 38, 123 Cal.
Rptr. at 470.
96. Id. at 45, 539 P.2d at 38-39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 470-71. The drivers, aged
17 and 19, reached speeds of up to 80 miles per hour attempting to beat each
other to the disc jockey. Id. at 45, 539 P.2d at 38, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 470. The
issue of which driver actually forced the victim off the street and into a divider
was unresolved. Id. One driver stopped to report the accident, but the other
paused only briefly before going on to collect the prize of $25. Id. at 45, 539
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ruling that the first amendment does not sanction the infliction
of harm "merely because achieved by word, rather than act."9
The court indicated neither what the first amendment does pro-
tect, nor what courts should consider in distinguishing words
from acts.98 Although the result may have been correct, a more
complete analysis of the competing interests would have made
the court's opinion more convincing and would have provided
better guidance to courts in future cases.
In Hyde v. City of Columbia99 the plaintiff sued a newspa-
per for publishing her name and address after she had escaped
from a kidnapper who was still at large.L ° After publication,
the kidnapper telephoned the plaintiff and appeared in the area
of her home on several occasions.10' Allowing the negligence
claim, the court ruled that the first amendment protects speech
only to the extent that the first amendment interests are not
outweighed by other interests. 02 The court neither adequately
P.2d at 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471. The court found that the accident was a fore-
seeable result of the defendant's broadcast. Id. at 46-47, 539 P.2d at 39-40, 123
Cal. Rptr. at 471-72.
97. Id. at 48, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472. The court held the de-
fendant liable after determining that the conduct was a legal cause of the
harm. Id. The lower court had instructed the jury that a defendant is respon-
sible for the conduct of others when that conduct is directed or influenced by
the defendant's business activity. Id. at 51, 539 P.2d at 42, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
98. Cf. supra note 36. As in Justice Black's dissent in Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971), the court in Weirum avoided analyzing the limits of the
first amendment but stopped short of summarily labeling the incident as con-
duct rather than speech. See Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 48, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal.
Rptr. at 472.
99. 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
100. Id. at 253.
101. Id. at 254 & n.2. The plaintiff sought compensation for mental anguish
arising from threatened, not actual, physical harm. IH at 253; see IAnder,
supra note 1 at 421-26. Nonetheless, analysis of the conflicting interests of per-
sonal safety and free speech should be substantially the same as if physical
harm had occurred. See infra note 142.
102. Hyde, 637 S.W.2d at 264-65 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974)). The court also stated that newspapers have a duty to foresee the
misconduct of third parties. Id. at 257 ("In certain situations, the law expects a
reasonable actor to anticipate and protect the plaintiff against the intentional
or criminal misconduct of a third person.... ."). Both Weirum alid Hyde in-
volved the possibility of liability against joint tortfeasors. See supra notes 94-
96, 99-101 and accompanying text. Neither court addressed whether the car
drivers and kidnapper should be held jointly liable. See Hyde, 637 S.W.2d at
253-65; Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 41-45, 539 P.2d at 37-40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 470-72.
In addition to analyzing the claim of common law negligence, the Hyde court
also considered state law in addressing the issue of media access to police files
and other records. Hyde, 637 S.W.2d at 259-65. The court noted that the plain-
tiff did not base her claim on either invasion of privacy or libel. Id. at 254, 264.
If the claim had been based on one of these alternative theories, the court
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identified these other interests, nor explained how the other in-
terests outweighed the first amendment in that particular case.
As in Weirum, the result in Hyde may have been correct, but
the opinion provides little guidance for future courts.
Thus, the harm-oriented approach has proven inadequate
to address the issues arising in cases of physical injury caused
by negligent use of words. The lack of articulated justifications
for the decisions in Weirum and Hyde poses the danger that
courts may rely on the conclusory statements103 made in those
cases and thereby curtail the first amendment protection of
speech.1' 4
B. DEFICIENCIES OF THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH
Courts using the categorical approach to analyze negligent
use of words cases adopt a two-step analysis. The courts first
address whether the speech falls into the unprotected category
of incitement.10 5 If the speech is not unprotected, the courts
then apply language from defamation cases to determine that
civil liability may not be imposed.106 The courts, however, mis-
apply first amendment principles and Supreme Court prece-
dents in each of these steps, producing anomalous results.
1. Categorizing the Speech
Courts using the categorical approach have uniformly ana-
lyzed the speech in terms of incitement, finding in each case
that the defendant's speech did not meet the Brandenburg
test.10 7 Walt Disney Productions v. Shannon 08 involved an
might have found that the speech was unprotected. See supra notes 59-82 and
accompanying text. The court, however, did not consider first amendment
protections in depth.
103. See supra note 93; rf. Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F.
Supp. 199, 202 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (judgment of cause by general television vio-
lence would provide no recognizable standard for potential defendants). Simi-
lar to an unprincipled conclusion of cause, an unprincipled imposition of duty
without attention to first amendment protections would provide no reasonable
standard to guide potential media defendants. Courts have relied on the ratio-
nales of earlier decisions to support their holdings, often ignoring that the ear-
lier cases themselves have misapplied precedent. See infra note 133. The
repetition of misplaced reliance strengthens the erroneous reasoning. The his-
tory of the categorical approach to negligence claims against media defendants
provides an example of this. See infra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
104. This Note proposes a standard of analysis to assist courts in resolving
the problem. See infra notes 165-97 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. Incitement is the pre-
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eleven-year-old plaintiff who was partially blinded in an at-
tempt to duplicate an experiment portrayed on a children's tel-
evision program. 10 9 Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co." 0
concerned a nine-year-old girl who had been sexually assaulted
by a group of youths after they watched and discussed a similar
event depicted in a television drama.' DeFilippo v. National
Broadcasting Co.1 2 involved a thirteen-year-old boy who hung
himself after seeing a program showing a simulated self-hang-
ing, despite the program's warning against duplicating the
stunt.113 Herceg v. Hustler Magazine,114 concerned a fourteen-
year-old boy who hung himself after reading an article about
ferred category because the harm comes about as a result of someone, either
the plaintiff or a third person, acting on the words of the defendant. The goal
of incitement regulations is to prevent lawless and violent activity by persons
hearing the defendant's words. See id. The courts applying Brandenburg fail
to distinguish between imposing liability for the content of speech and impos-
ing liability for the results of speech. See infra notes 120-23, 135 and accompa-
nying text.
108. 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981).
109. Id. at 402, 276 S.E.2d at 581. The demonstration involved reproducing
a sound effect by rolling a BB in a large, round balloon. Id. The program in-
vited viewers to try the experiment themselves, perhaps misrepresenting the
degree of difficulty involved. Id. The plaintiff used a piece of lead about twice
the size of a BB and a balloon that was long and skinny. Id. The balloon
burst, impelling the lead into the boy's eye, partially blinding him. The court
held that the program was not a clear and present danger, id. at 404, 405, 276
S.E.2d at 582, 583 (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)), pre-
sumably meaning that the program was not incitement. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text. In support of its conclusion, the court noted that of an es-
timated sixteen million children who viewed the program, only the plaintiff
reported being injured in attempting to duplicate the experiment. Id. at 405
n.4, 276 S.E.2d at 583 n.4.
110. 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), cert denied, 458 U.S.
1108 (1982). The attack on the plaintiff included a sexual attack with a bottle.
Id. at 491, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 890. The television program depicted an instance of
artificial rape in which the victim was assaulted with a plumber's helper. Id.
at 491-92, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91.
111. Id. at 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 888. The plaintiff conceded that the de-
fendant did not intend the conduct to occur and that the speech was not incite-
ment. Id. at 491 & n.1, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 490 & n.1.
112. 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982).
113. Id. at 1037. After warning viewers not to attempt the stunt them-
selves, the performer went on to state that he knew a person who "almost
broke his neck" attempting to do the trick. Id. at 1038. The court held that the
defendant was not guilty of incitement in the absence of intent to induce the
conduct. See id. at 1040, 1041.
114. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988). In an
earlier trial, the court dismissed the negligence claim, but allowed amendment
of the complaint to include the incitement claim. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine,
565 F. Supp. 802 (1983). The court relied on Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979), and on Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488,
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auto-erotic asphyxia, despite the magazine's warnings not to at-
tempt the act.115 In each of these four cases, the court held that
the speech involved did not meet the Brandenburg incitement
test because the defendants did not intend for the injurious
conduct to occur-' 6
The courts' application of the Brandenburg1 7 incitement
test to cases alleging physical injury caused by negligent use of
words ignores the distinction between the interests Branden-
burg protected and the interests of the plaintiffs in negligence
cases. In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court categorized incite-
ment as unprotected speech because it determined that the
state interest in maintaining order in incitement situations out-
weighed the interest in free speech.118 Negligence theory, on
the other hand, balances the conduct's utility against the mag-
nitude of the risk that it creates.119 In holding that the speech
complained of in these negligence cases was not incitement, the
courts have said little about the state interest of protecting
health and safety and fail to examine the differences between
this interest and the interests at stake in traditional incitement
cases.
The incitement analysis also fails to distinguish between
regulating speech as speech and imposing liability for the re-
sults of speech. Under Brandenburg a defendant may be crimi-
nally penalized when the state can show the speaker's intent to
incite and the likelihood of resulting lawless activity at the time
of the speech,120 even if the activity does not materialize.121
178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1988), and DeFilippo, 466
A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982). See supra notes 93, 110-13 and accompanying text.
115. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1018-19. Auto-erotic asphyxia involves hanging
oneself while masturbating. Id. at 1018. The loss of oxygen to the brain alleg-
edly heightens the sensation. Id. According to the article, the practice is
somewhat common, with as many as one thousand teenagers dying each year
while attempting the feat. Id. The article was introduced as giving information
on the pleasures of unusual and taboo sexual practices. Id. The magazine
stated that it presented the article to increase readers' awareness of alterna-
tive sexual practices and to lessen their inhibitions. Id. An editor's note
warned that the practice was dangerous and recommended that readers not at-
tempt the act or to do so only if "you're anxious to wind up in cold storage,
with a coroner's tag on your big toe." Id. at 1018-19.
116. See su a notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text; notes 108-16 and accom-
panying text.
118. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); see supra notes 54-
58 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
120. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49.
121. See id. at 450, 454-55 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas con-
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The defendant is penalized for the expression itself, not the re-
sulting harm. In contrast, a negligence claim requires a mea-
surable, foreseeable injury resulting from the defendant's
conduct.2- 2 The entire Brandenburg analysis is, therefore, inap-
propriate because it focuses on the defendant's intent and on
the likelihood of lawless activity rather than on the total cir-
cumstances of the case and the elements of duty, breach, causa-
tion, and injury.13
2. Holding No Liability for Protected Speech
After determining that the speech in question does not fit
into a recognized category of unprotected speech, courts have
held that liability cannot be imposed on protected speech. In
reaching that conclusion, the courts in the four cases discussed
above' 24 misapplied language from the defamation case of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.1-5 These courts did not directly ap-
ply principles of defamation law, but merely inappropriately
used language from the case to support their reasoning.2 6
curred in the judgment reversing the conviction but wrote separately because
he believed that the test enunciated by the Court left too much of the clear
and present danger test intact and allowed governments to punish speech as
speech apart from the acts the speech actually causes. Id. Justice Black joined
in Justice Douglas's opinion. Id. at 449. After Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105
(1973), see supra note 56 and accompanying text, the emphasis is on the
speaker's intent and the imminence of the likely unlawful action, both mea-
sured by an objective standard. See R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG,
supra note 30, § 20.15, at 63-65.
122. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
125. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
126. See Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 494,
178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (1981) ('"e fear of damage awards ... may be mark-
edly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute."
(quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277)), cert denied, 458 U.S.
1108 (1982); see also Walt Disney Prods. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 403-04 n.1, 276
S.E.2d 580, 582 n.1 (1981) (same New York Times quote, although stating ear-
lier that New York Times was inapposite to case); cf. Herceg v. Hustler Maga-
zine, 814 F.2d 1017, 1023 (1987) (same quote), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1219 (1988).
A spirited concurrence in Herceg argued that the plaintiffs should have been
allowed to proceed on a negligence theory. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1025 (Jones, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The opinion concurred only be-
cause the plaintiff failed to cross-appeal on the dismissal of the negligence
claim and the only issue before the court was whether the article constituted
incitement. Id. The concurring opinion is highly emotional and aims most of
its vigor at pornographic publications. See id. at 1025-26. It is not clear
whether the concurring judge would allow recovery in negligence against a
nonpornographic publication.
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Based on the Supreme Court's statement in New York
Times that the civil penalties sought in that case would result
in self-imposed prior restraints, 2 7 the courts have concluded
that civil penalties against media defendants for physical inju-
ries to private individuals are also impermissible.12s In relying
on the New York Times language, however, the courts have ig-
nored the fact that the New York Times Court was concerned
with avoiding prior restraints on speech critical of public offi-
cials.129 Moreover, in quoting the language, the courts inappro-
priately omitted the New York Times reference to the specific
circumstances in that case.130
Courts considering liability for physical injury caused by
negligent use of words have also misused the New York Times
principle that states cannot achieve by civil liability what they
cannot by criminal sanctions. 131 Courts have applied this prin-
ciple to bar recovery for negligent but protected speech because
states cannot criminalize such speech. 32 Again, the courts have
overlooked the specific application of this principle by the
127. 376 U.S. at 277.
128. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
129. New York Times involved a public official who allegedly had been de-
famed. 376 U.S. at 256. In the negligence cases considered in this Note, private
plaintiffs suffered physical injury. See supra notes 94-96, 99-101, 107-15. New
York Times and its progeny established different standards for private and
public plaintiffs in defamation. See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
The courts addressing negligent use of words claims have not considered the
public official and private figure distinction or the dignitary invasion and phys-
ical injury differences. The interest in protecting the safety of a private indi-
vidual should be given at least as much weight as the interest in protecting
that individual's reputation. See supra notes 9, 59 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 494, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 892 (" 'he
fear of damage awards ... may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of
prosecution under a criminal statute."' (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at
277)). The words omitted at the ellipsis are "such as that invoked by the Ala-
bama courts here." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277. The Court in New York
Times was concerned about a specific incident-an outrageous attempt to stop
the criticism of government officials during the struggle for equal rights for
blacks by awarding damages one thousand times greater than the maximum
criminal fine. Id. The lower court awarded these damages with no proof of
actual damage to the plaintiff. Id. Certainly, actions like those of the Ala-
bama courts would threaten the protections of the first amendment because
criticism of government officials is at the core of the underlying policies of
free speech. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. For another court
to quote the Supreme Court's statement out of context, turning it into a con-
stitutional principle, does not rationally advance the inquiry into the limits of
free speech. Such conclusory misapplications of principles adequately protect
neither plaintiffs' nor defendants' rights.
131. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277.
132. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court in New York Times. There, the Court was con-
cerned that states would attempt to use civil liability to censor
political speech. 33 In New York Times, the Court was not ad-
dressing the issue of liability on the results of speech. 134 Fur-
thermore, the Court apparently has left open the question of
whether civil liability may be based on the results of protected
speech. 35
133. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court in
New York Times feared that huge damage awards in the lower courts would
lead to prior restraints that otherwise could not be imposed by criminal sanc-
tions. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277. The Court's statements must be
viewed in the context of the factual situation. Fear that the award would lead
to prior restraint through self-censorship and the statement that states cannot
achieve by civil libel law what they cannot achieve by criminal sanction both
relate to the necessity of allowing free and open criticism of official action by
public officials. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277, 279; see supra notes 26-27
and accompanying text. Courts have treated this network of concerns as dis-
tinct concepts and used each to reinforce the other and support their dismissal
of negligence claims. This treatment has blurred further the factual situation
that the Supreme Court was addressing in New York Times. See Olivia N., 126
Cal. App. 3d at 494, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 892 (treating fear of prior restraint and
fear of using civil law as substitute for criminal sanctions as separate con-
cepts). In DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (II. 1982),
see supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text, the court in dismissing the
plaintiff's claim relied on Olivia N.'s use of New York Times. See DeFilippo,
446 A.2d at 1040. The court in Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 565 F. Supp. 802
(S.D. Tex. 1983) relied on both Olivia N. and DeFilippo. See Herceg, 565 F.
Supp. at 804.
In each of these cases, the factual situations and the issues differed from
those in New York Times. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. The
courts made no effort to determine whether these factual differences should
raise distinct legal issues. Courts should ask, for example, whether the fact
that plaintiffs might prove actual, rather than presumed, damages should alter
the first amendment analysis. The line of cases, each relying on the preceding,
allows the misapplication of New York Times to become stronger and more
firmly ingrained.
134. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). In Clai-
borne the plaintiff sued the NAACP and others for damages resulting from a
black boycott. Id. at 928. The suit alleged that several speeches, one by
Charles Evers, led to incidents of violence and an unlawful boycott. Id. The
Court found that Evers's speech was not incitement as defined by Branden-
burg and must be regarded as protected speech. Id. at 928-29. In dictum the
Court stated: "In the course of those [speeches], strong language was used. If
that language had been followed by acts of violence, a substantial question
would be presented whether Evers could be held liable for the consequences of
that unlawful conduct." Id. at 928 (emphasis added). At least two interpreta-
tions of the Court's cryptic statement are possible. First, the Court could be
implying that had violence occurred, the speech would then meet the Bran-
denburg requirements and be deemed incitement and, therefore, unprotected
speech. The problem with this interpretation is that Brandenburg is an objec-
tive test and the status of the speech as protected or unprotected is determined
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To give proper consideration to claims of physical injury
caused by speech, courts must acknowledge that negligence
claims seek to impose liability on the results and not on the
content or category of speech. 136 While citing and misapplying
language from New York Times, the courts ignore the analogy
to defamation law, which balances the specific interests to be
protected in each case. 37
3. The Anomalous Results of the Categorical Approach
The categorical approach, identifying speech as either pro-
tected or unprotected and barring civil liability for protected
speech, does not consider adequately the state interest in pro-
tecting individuals from physical harm. 3 8 This leads to the
anomalous result of barring the claims of physically injured
plaintiffs while allowing the claims of plaintiffs suffering the
dignitary injuries of damaged reputation, shame, or embarrass-
ment as a result of defamation or invasion of privacy. Thus,
under the categorical approach, the first amendment bars re-
covery when a victim is blinded,139 sexually assaulted,' 40 or
at the time of utterance, not by ensuing events. The likelihood, not the actual-
ity, of lawless action is the standard. See supra notes 54-58, 121 and accompa-
nying text. Thus, whether unlawful action actually occurs is irrelevant to
whether the speech is protected. Furthermore, the Court did not frame the
question as whether liability could be imposed for the speech, but rather as
whether liability could flow from the consequences of any ensuing lawless con-
duct. Claiborne, 418 U.S. at 928. This leads to the second interpretation of the
dictum-that courts may impose liability for the consequences arising out of
speech, even if the speech itself is protected.
136. Courts have also cited cases that prohibit the imposition of liability
based on the content of speech. See Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 492, 178 Cal.
Rptr. at 891 (states cannot regulate speech based on its content or message)
(citing Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)); DeFilippo, 446
A.2d at 1042 (same). Mosley involved a regulation barring all peaceful picket-
ing except labor picketing. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92-93. The Court, concerned
about misplaced time, place, and manner regulations, noted that such regula-
tion is allowed, but not if it is applied in a discriminatory manner based on the
content or message of the speech. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99; see supra note 46.
The courts citing Mosley have failed to distinguish the circumstances of that
case and the issue that the Court was addressing. Forbidding discriminatory
regulation that uses speech content as a criterion for time, place, and manner
restrictions is not relevant to the imposition of liability based on the results of
speech.
137. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
139. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E. 2d 580 (1981);
see supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
140. See Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178
Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982); supra notes 110-11 and
accompanying text.
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killed 41 as a result of protected speech, but allows recovery for
defamation when a plaintiff is called a communist.142 Allowing
defamed plaintiffs to recover damages without proving actual
harm' 43 compounds the contradiction.
This Note's opening scenario"4 demonstrates another
anomalous result of disallowing recovery for negligent use of
words. Both hypothetical plaintiffs suffered the same injury re-
sulting from essentially the same cause. While one plaintiff re-
covered under a medical malpractice theory, however, the first
amendment barred the other plaintiff's claim of negligent use
of words. The differing results are explicable only by mis-
guided application of first amendment principles. Courts have
not stated convincingly why an actor will be excused from lia-
141. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017 (1987), cert denied, S.
Ct. 1219 (1988); DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (LI.
1982); supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
142. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 1982) (awarding
plaintiff $400,000 on remand), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983). The position
taken here is not that the plaintiffs necessarily should be compensated. Other
considerations may determine that recovery is not available. See infra notes
165-97 and accompanying text. A more consistent approach to first amend-
ment problems, however, will reduce the occurrence of anomalous results.
One reason why courts are more willing to compensate defamation plain-
tiffs, as compared to those claiming in negligence, may be that defamation has
been recognized in common law for a longer time. See PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 9, § 28, at 160 (negligence recognized as cause of action only since
early nineteenth century); R. SMOLLA, supra note 75, § 1.02 (tracing history of
defamation to its widespread recognition by late sixteenth century). Negli-
gence law, however, grew from trespass and trespass on the case, causes of ac-
tion at least as old as defamation. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 161.
Hyde, in which the defendant published the plaintiff's name and address
after a kidnapping, illustrates potentially inconsistent results based on slightly
differing facts. Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982),
cert denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983). A suit for invasion of privacy might have
been successful if the plaintiff had been able to establish that the information
was not newsworthy. Cf. supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. A court
applying a strict categorical approach would probably dismiss the suit, how-
ever, if the kidnapper returned and killed the plaintiff and her survivors sued
in negligence. Cf. supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text (courts using cat-
egorical approach dismiss suit if speech not incitement). Publishing the ad-
dress would not be incitement because the publisher would not intend the
harmful conduct to occur and the likelihood of harmful activity would be
questionable, so the Brandenburg test would not be satisfied. See supra notes
54-58 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
144. See supra text accompanying note 1. The intent element of Branden-
burg could be assumed because the defendant's book strongly encouraged fol-
lowing the diet. That conduct, however, is not the type of lawless or violent
action that courts attempt to eliminate through application of Brandenburg.
See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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bility for injury resulting from words but held liable when the
same injury results from analogous actions.145
Protection of speech remains an important goal for courts.
Nevertheless, protection of other societal interests, especially
health and safety, may outweigh the interests in protecting a
specific instance of speech.14 The courts' failure to consider
the totality of the circumstances, the interests to be protected,
and the significant differences in the issues raised in negligent
use of words cases and other first amendment cases results in
rationales for denying recovery that are less than convincing.
III. A SUGGESTED POLICY OF NEGLIGENCE FOR
MEDIA DEFENDANTS
The preceding criticisms of the analyses and the results in
negligent use of words cases do not resolve the questions
whether courts should impose liability in negligence against
media defendants and whether such liability is possible without
endangering free speech protections. The underlying policy of
negligence theory to protect individuals from unreasonable
risks of harm,147 and the imposition of liability for invasion of
dignitary interests in defamation and invasion of privacy with-
out unduly burdening first amendment protection,148 provide a
policy basis for establishing a standard of negligence for media
defendants. 149 Carefully applied traditional negligence theory,
145. Cf. Weirum v. RKO Gen., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 48, 539 P.2d 36, 40, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 472 (first amendment does not sanction infliction of injuries merely
because achieved by words rather than actions).
146. See infra notes 165-88 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 9-15 and
accompanying text. In balancing the competing interests, the issue should be
whether the utility of the actor's speech-related conduct, as measured by first
amendment policy considerations, outweighs the magnitude of the risk that it
creates for a third person. This returns the analysis to whether a duty should
be imposed on the speaker.
147. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. Tort law generally and
negligence law specifically seek to redress individual injury to provide an equi-
table placement of loss. Several considerations influence the determination of
where to place the loss. Assessing fault, deterring future wrongdoing when
possible, providing clear standards of conduct, shifting loss to the one best able
to bear it, and avoiding the disrupting effects of self-help all are policy consid-
erations that have combined to produce current negligence law. See generally
PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 9, § 3, at 15-20; id. § 30, at 164-68.
148. See supra notes 59-82 and accompanying text.
149. Depriving injured parties of the means to recover for the losses they
have suffered might also be a violation of due process. The fifth and four-
teenth amendments to the Constitution require due process before the state
may deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property. U.S. CONST. amends. V,
XIV. Not allowing a plaintiff to proceed with a negligence claim removes this
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balancing the interests of plaintiffs and defendants on a case-
by-case, ad hoc basis, will provide for the imposition of liability
constitutional procedural safeguard. A plaintiff is thus deprived of his physical
well-being without being allowed access to the process by which he could re-
ceive just compensation. In discussing cases of improper use of private infor-
mation, such as broadcasting a performer's act, Professor Tribe notes that, at
some point, the state is depriving the victim of liberty or property without due
process if it provides no legal remedy. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 12-4, at 650 (1978).
Some commentaries have suggested various standards that courts might
use to impose liability in cases of physical injury caused by speech. One sug-
gestion is that courts adopt a standard of "stringent negligence" in cases of im-
itative violence, which would require the plaintiff to prove with clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant acted with knowledge, intent, or in
reckless disregard of potential harm. See Note, Tort Law--TeleViolence:
Should Broadcasters Be Liable?, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 897, 911-15 (1984).
This stringent negligence standard combines the Brandenburg incitement test
and the actual malice test of New York Times. The practical applicability of
such a test is questionable because a plaintiff could rarely, if ever, prove this
degree of culpability by a media defendant.
Another possible solution would be for courts to modify Brandenburg so
that "directed to inciting," Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447, means that the incite-
ment is found in the speaker's words themselves and the speaker's intent is
irrelevant. See Note, Tort Liability of the Media for Audience Acts of Vio-
lence: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 529, 562-63 (1979). The
problem with this approach is that it admittedly returns to the clear and pres-
ent danger standard, see id. at 562, under which a good deal of speech was
inappropriately suppressed. See supra note 58. The suggestion also ignores
the Supreme Court's clarification after Brandenburg that "directed at inciting"
means intending to incite. See Hess v. Indiana 414 U.S. 105 (1973); supra note
56. Brandenburg is inapposite to the analysis of negligence in free speech mat-
ters. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
Yet another suggestion is that courts approach the problem in terms of
misrepresentation. See Note, Tort Liability for Nonlibelous Negligent State-
ments: First Amendment Considerations, 93 YALE L.J. 744, 752-58 (1984).
This approach would involve a two-pronged analysis asking if the defendant
intended that the act be imitated and if adequate warning was given. Id. The
intent element would preclude claims in many of the cases including those
like Weirum v. RKO Gen., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975),
see supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text; Olivia N. v. National Broadcast-
ing Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488 (1975), 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), cert denied, 458
U.S. 1108 (1982), see supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text; Hyde v. City of
Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1226
(1983), see supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text; and probably DeFilippo
v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982), see supra notes 112-13
and accompanying text, in which the defendant not only had no intention that
the act be duplicated, but in all likelihood specifically intended that it not be
copied. Thus, none of the three suggested approaches would reach all of the
cases, because each applies at most only to cases of imitative violence. The
question is whether negligence law in its more traditional forms can reach
cases of media conduct in which intent, knowledge, and the other require-
ments of these suggested approaches cannot be proven.
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in appropriate circumstances without threatening the protec-
tions of free speech.
A. THE ARGUME FOR AD Hoc BALANCING
The Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to allow
lower courts to undertake ad hoc balancing, questioning
whether ad hoc resolution of competing interests is feasible and
doubting the wisdom of committing the task to judges.150 The
Court has been concerned that ad hoc balancing would subject
media defendants to judicial second-guessing,151 would not pro-
vide predictability and certainty, 5 2 and would require constant
supervision by the Court.153
In recent cases, however, the Court has set guidelines that
not only allow, but require, lower courts to engage in ad hoc
analyses of competing interests. Defamation.1  and invasion of
privacy' 55 cases require courts to determine whether speech is
of public concern,1' a determination that can only be achieved
on a case-by-case basis and that is, in essence, a determination
of the value and utility of the speech. 157 Further, Justice Pow-
ell has stated that "speech on matters of purely private concern
is of less First Amendment concern."'158 Justice Marshall, one
150. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343, 346 (1974) (balancing is
unpredictable; not wise to commit task to conscience of judges).
151. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 63 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (ad hoc balancing would lead to second-guessing of newsworthiness
of each item printed).
152. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343; Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 81 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
153. See, e.g., Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 81 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
154. See supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) (in libel suit
following magazine article about plaintiff's divorce, issue was whether speech
is of public concern).
157. The determination that speech is of public concern is a determination
of its value and can only be accomplished by an ad hoc balancing of the speech
and the interests involved. See id. at 487 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The
meaning that the Court attributes to the term 'public controversy' used in
Gertz resurrects the precise difficulties that I thought Gertz was designed to
avoid."). The difficulties Justice Marshall refers to are ad hoc balancing and
determination of the value of speech. See supra notes 150-53 and accompany-
ing text.
158. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985)
(emphasis added) (false credit report did not require showing of actual mal-
ice). Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined Justice Powell in this plurality
decision. Id. The effect of Dun & Bradstreet has been to return defamation of
private individuals to its common law status, removing constitutional barriers.
See Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of
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of the most persistent voices against ad hoc balancing in first
amendment cases,159 has said that "[u]ndoubtedly, ad hoc bal-
ancing may be appropriate in some circumstances that involve
First Amendment problems.'160 Thus, in defamation cases in-
volving private figure plaintiffs and thus a negligence standard
of care,16x courts necessarily balance the value of the speech
against the plaintiff's interest.
62
Most claims of physical injury from negligent use of words
will involve speech that does not invoke the type of public con-
cern warranting the highest degree of first amendment protec-
tion.163 Additionally, the plaintiff is likely to be a private
figure.164 Given the state interest in protecting individuals
from and compensating them for physical injury and the pri-
Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 78-93 (1983). In addition to the three Justices of
the plurality, Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, in concurring opinions,
suggested reexamining and perhaps overruling the constitutional barriers es-
tablished by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in cases of defa-
mation of public officials. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 764 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); id. at 766-74 (White, J., concurring). Thus, at the time of the Dun
& Bradstreet opinion, a minimum of five Justices felt comfortable with a negli-
gence standard, at least in cases involving private figures defamed by speech
that is not of public concern. Cf. Smolla, supra, at 1, 78-93 (suggesting return
to common law defamation principles to define first amendment limits).
Smolla also pointed out that in those defamation cases involving private
figures, in which the standard of fault is negligence, courts necessarily balance
the utility of the speech against the plaintiff's interests:
What the Supreme Court did not realize, and what many lower courts
continue to fail to realize, is that the traditional formula for determin-
ing negligence liability cannot be meaningfully employed in action for
defamation without plugging in some measure of the social utility of
the subject matter of the defamatory communications.
Id. at 82. Thus, in the case of a defamed private individual, courts must weigh
the utility of the speech in the balance.
159. For example, see Justice Marshall's dissents in Firestone, 424 U.S. at
488 (arguing against ad hoc balancing); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S.
29, 81 (1971) (same); and the dissent of Justice Brennan in Dun & Bradstreet,
472 U.S. at 774, in which Justice Marshall joined (same).
160. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 81 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
161. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
163. In this Note's proposal, public concern would be part of the balancing
process. See infra notes 168-77 and accompanying text.
164. Given the state interest in its citizens' physical well-being, the interest
at stake in these cases is of paramount importance. See supra note 6 and ac-
companying text. The issue is not whether ad hoc balancing is plausible, see
Gertz v. Robert Welch,. Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) (case-by-case scrutiny of
every libel case not feasible), but whether any other analysis is just. Conceiva-
bly, a physical injury could result from speech involving a public official. For
example, an official might commit suicide after disclosure of improper activi-
ties. In such cases, courts properly would apply a malice standard when a re-
port is false and should also carefully scrutinize the issue of foreseeability.
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vate nature of both the speech and the plaintiffs, the "circum-
stances" in which ad hoc balancing is appropriate should
include personal injury caused by negligent speech.
B. SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR THE COURTS IN BALANCING
INTERESTS
Courts should apply traditional negligence theory, utilizing
the elements of duty, breach, causation, and injury,165 in decid-
ing liability for physical injury caused by negligent use of
words. Courts should incorporate first amendment interests
into the negligence analysis, particularly in terms of the duty
element.1'
In determining whether the defendant owes a duty to the
plaintiff, first amendment policy should be part of the analysis.
Courts should balance the utility of the media conduct with re-
spect to free speech 167 against the magnitude of the foreseeable
risk of physical injury created by the speech.168 In making this
assessment, courts should consider the interests underlying the
protection of speech and the degree to which the particular ex-
pression advances those interests. 69 Courts should determine
the utility of the speech by asking whether the speech fosters
the free criticism of government,170 adds to the marketplace of
ideas,171 advances self-expression, 172 or provides a safety valve
for societal fears.173 Courts should consider these interests,
along with others they might identify, on a case-by-case basis
165. See supra notes 9-22 and accompanying text.
166. Separating the analysis or ignoring either first amendment or negli-
gence principles, as the courts have done, see supra notes 90-137 and accompa-
nying text, makes balancing the interests impossible. The courts start with a
presumption favoring either the negligence theory or the first amendment
principles and fail to address the specific interests to be protected in the fac-
tual situations. See supra notes 94-104, 117-23; cf. Smolla, supra note 158, at
71-93 (suggesting return to common law defamation principles to define first
amendment limits).
167. Cf. supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text (interests served by free
speech).
168. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text. A careful analysis of
the speech's utility in advancing these interests will preclude conclusory judg-
ments either for or against imposition of duty. Courts may find some other
rationale for protecting speech in addition to those discussed, but they should
carefully articulate and defend any newly identified rationale for protecting
speech.
170. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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within the total circumstances of the expression and the in-
jury.174 This utility analysis would be similar to, and no more
difficult than, the determination whether speech is of public
concern 75 or, as in privacy cases, whether the subject matter is
newsworthy.176 After determining utility, courts should bal-
ance it against the magnitude of the foreseeable risk of injury
to decide whether a duty exists.177 Breach of duty and the
existence of a compensable injury7 8 should present no special
difficulties in these cases.
Thus, applying this analysis to a case like Weirum, 79 in
which the speech at issue urged drivers to find a wandering disc
jockey, 80 a court could determine that the speech had little, if
any, value in advancing criticism of the political process, adding
to the marketplace of ideas, advancing self-expression, or serv-
ing as a societal safety valve.' 8 ' The court would then weigh
this low value of speech against the magnitude of the foresee-
able risk created. 8 2 Because the station aimed the program at
teenagers, 8 3 the station should have foreseen the risk of harm.
Automobile accidents obviously involve the possibility of great
harm, making the risk of high magnitude. Balancing these fac-
tors, a court could reasonably impose a duty.184
174. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
176. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. For example, determin-
ing public concern and newsworthiness requires courts to assess the parties'
specific interests as well as the general public's "right to hear." See supra note
32. These issues might be particularly important in cases of political speech
and in entertainment.
177. Foreseeability of possbile harm, not the speaker's intent or the likeli-
hood of occurrence, should determine the magnitude of the risk. See supra
notes 10-14 and accompanying text. The number of persons actually injured
would be relevant perhaps to a determination of foreseeability, cf. supra note
109, but would not be the only factor.
178. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text. Proof of injury would
require the same elements as proof of injury in any negligence suit.
179. Weirum v. RKO Gen., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468
(1975); see supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
180. Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 44-45, 539 P.2d at 38, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
181. The newsworthiness of the information, see supra notes 81-82, and the
reader's right to know, see supra note 32, would be a part of the analysis to
determine the value of the speech.
182. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. The question would be
whether a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk of an automobile
accident occurring from the speech.
183. Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 43, 539 P.2d at 38, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
184. The Weirum decision suggested that speech for personal gain may
merit less protection. 15 Cal. 3d at 48, 539 P.2d at 40-41, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472-
73; cf. supra note 53 (commercial speech merits less protection). This resem-
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A court deciding a case such as Olivia N.,185 in which imita-
tive violence followed a fictional depiction of sexual assault,
should consider the high value of fiction in terms of self-ex-
pression.' 86 The court should also consider whether a reason-
able person would foresee the risk of imitation of the fictional
violence.' 87 Considering the high value of the speech, relative
to that in Weirum, and the questionable foreseeability, a court
might find no duty.
8 8
Causation of harm 8 9 could be difficult to prove, particu-
bles an evaluation of speech as a public concern, but the analysis of first
amendment concerns was overly brief and conclusory. See supra notes 94-98
and accompanying text.
185. Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 888 (1981), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982); see supra notes 110-11 and
accompanying text.
186. Cf. Smolla, supra note 158, at 87 ('Fiction is a critical component in a
robust and open culture."); supra notes 29-30, 32 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 182 and
accompanying text.
188. The balancing in this case presents more potential difficulties than in
other cases. The right to hear, see supra note 32 and accompanying text, and
the high degree of protection that society accords fiction, see supra note 186
and accompanying text, indicate the strong utility of entertainment speech.
The foreseeability of an occurrence such as happened in this case is questiona-
ble and a court might well decide that no duty exists. Similarly, a plaintiff in
such a case may be unable to assert an identifiable duty and breach. Cf
Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 201-03 (S.D. Fla.
1979); see supra note 103 and accompanying text. Because the court in Olivia
N. rejected the plaintiff's first amendment claim, some of the facts needed to
assess the existence of a duty are not in the opinion. The duration and explic-
itness of the televised episode, for example, would be helpful in assessing fore-
seeability.
Other cases would receive similar analysis. Of special interest are cases in
which violence follows demonstrations of or information regarding similar vio-
lence. See, eg., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988); see supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
In a case like Herceg, in which injury resulted from following instructions on
auto-erotic asphyxia, the utility of the speech, measured by first amendment
values, is low compared to the magnitude of the foreseeable risk. The resolu-
tion of the issue in a case like this would turn on whether the defendant gave
proper warning. The question for the jury is the adequacy of the defendant's
warning, especially considering the allegedly widespread harm arising from
the practice. In DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I.
1982), see supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text, the court discussed the
defendant's warning, id. at 1041, but did not consider the warning's adequacy.
Cases of imitative violence in which no warning was given, e.g., Walt Disney
Prods. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981), pose two questions for
resolution. A jury would have to determine the foreseeability of a duplication
of the trick and then determine whether a warning should have been given.
189. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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larly in cases of imitative violence.190 Cause-in-fact in such
cases may continue to be one of the major barriers to recov-
ery,191 but should not preclude the plaintiff's right to present
the claim.192 For example, causation may be more difficult to
assess in a case such as Olivia ., 19s in which injury results
from imitation of a depiction of general conduct offered as en-
tertainment, than in cases such as Shannon 9 or Herceg,195 in
which injury results from specific instruction on performance
of the conduct. Expert testimony may be some help to juries in
190. The problem in some cases of imitative violence would be the ability
to assess the degree to which the defendant's conduct influenced an already
predisposed person to duplicate the act. In a case such as Herceg, 814 F.2d
1017, see supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text, the determination of cause
would require the jury to consider whether the article was a but-for cause, see
supra note 17 and accompanying text, or a substantial factor, see supra note 18
and accompanying text. The defendant could possibly establish that the infor-
mation was readily available, the victim was seeking it, and it was only chance
that it happened to be the defendant's article the victim found. Defendant
might argue, therefore, that the article had no substantial effect, like throwing
a lighted match onto a forest fire. See supra note 18.
The problem of more than one cause would also be an issue in some cases.
If the defendant could establish the plaintiff's predisposition, the assessment
of fault would be altered. Juries would have to investigate the possibility of
contributory negligence in those cases. In the case of more than one publica-
tion contributing to the harm, joint liability would be considered. See supra
note 22.
191. Whether the publication or broadcast is either a but-for cause or a
substantial factor, see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text, may be partic-
ularly difficult to determine in some contexts, especially for what may be
termed generic crimes. For example, in Olivia N. defendants possibly could
present evidence that the perpetrators of the crime already possessed the ten-
dency and ability to commit the crime and would have assaulted the victim
whether or not the program had been broadcast. The only possible connection
with the broadcast, defendants could argue, is the possibility that it gave the
attackers the idea for the specific method of the crime.
The Herceg case, 814 F.2d 1017, see supra notes 114-15 and accompanying
text, provides another example. If the victim had already possessed some
knowledge of auto-erotic asphyxia and purchased the magazine only to obtain
the details, available also from other sources, the determination of whether
the article was a cause-in-fact, either as a but-for cause or a substantial factor,
would be difficult. The questions can, however, reasonably be left to juries,
which are not uncommonly called on to decide difficult cases.
192. See supra note 149 (denial of forum for plaintiff's claim may violate
due process). Many courts have granted defendants' motions for dismissal. A
better approach would be to allow trial on the merits. A court legitimately
could find that the plaintiff had failed to meet the burden of proving the ele-
ments of negligence.
193. 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888; see supra notes 110-11 and ac-
companying text.
194. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580; see supra notes 108-09 and ac-
companying text.
195. Herceg, 814 F.2d 1017; see supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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determining cause-in-fact. 196
This Note's suggested approach provides guidance for
courts analyzing the competing interests in cases of physical in-
jury caused by negligent use of words. Rather than relying on
conclusory judgments or misapplication of first amendment
principles,19 7 courts following the suggested approach would fo-
cus on the specific facts and issues of the cases presented and
arrive at more sound conclusions.
C. MAINTAINING THE PROTECTIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
This Note's suggested approach gives proper consideration
to first amendment interests by introducing these interests into
the analysis of the duty element of negligence.198 Requiring
courts to consider first amendment interests in determining the
existence of a duty poses no special problems because courts al-
ready determine when speech is in an unprotected category and
the circumstances under which it may be regulated.199 The sug-
gested approach also furthers first amendment interests be-
196. As is often the case when determination of an issue depends on expert
testimony, the evidence may be contradictory. Compare 1 NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF MENTAL HEALTH, TELEVISION AND BEHAviOR TEN YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC
PROGRESS AND IMPUCATIONS FOR THE EIGHTIES 6 (1982) (reporting general
consensus among researchers on causal connection between television and acts
of violence) with Walsh, Wide World ofReports, 220 Sci. 804 (1983) (reporting
television networks' critique of NIMH study). The Herceg and Olivia N. ex-
amples, discussed supra note 191, could be instances when the court would, as
a policy matter, find no proximate cause because the circumstances were too
attenuated, see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. See also in text
accompanying notes 213-15. Additionally, courts or juries would need to con-
sider whether other causes or joint tortfeasors were determining factors in the
harm. See supra note 22. Further, courts and juries would weigh the plain-
tiff's culpability carefully in self-injury cases. The degree of comparative neg-
ligence attributable to the plaintiff's action, see supra note 22 and
accompanying text, would be a question of fact for the jury to determine.
197. See supra notes 107-37 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. This proposed approach
conceivably could be assessed as creating a new category of unprotected
speech-speech that creates an unreasonable risk of injury. Avoiding the cate-
gorical difficulties is important so that automatic rejection or granting of com-
pensation, as has happened in past cases, does not continue. Identifying speech
as a category, either protected or unprotected, distracts analysis from the more
important issues of the specific case. Furthermore, negligent speech could not
be a category of unprotected speech because negligence, unlike defamation and
incitement, is determined only by analysis of duty and breach. See supra notes
86-88 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 40-82 and accompanying text. In defamation cases
courts already have the responsibility of determining the value of speech. See
supra notes 61-76.
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cause, unlike the categorical approach, it protects speech as
speech.20 0 The categorical approach allows regulation of speech
according to its nature.20 1 The suggested approach, on the
other hand, imposes liability for the results of speech. Punish-
ing speech itself presents a greater danger to the first amend-
ment than allowing liability in negligence for the harm
resulting from the speech.20 2
A potential criticism of allowing liability for negligent use
of words is that no standards can be articulated that would give
200. See supra notes 54-58, 120-21 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 49-60, 88, 120-21 and accompanying text. The question
not answered by the courts is what does protection mean. Brandenburg allows
the punishment of speech as speech, which appears to be exactly what the first
amendment is supposed to protect against. The real meaning of the first
amendment may anticipate the imposition of liability for harm caused by
speech while prohibiting the prior regulation of speech. Theodore Schroeder,
a founder of and attorney for the Free Speech League stated:
By freedom of speech I do not mean the right to agree with the ma-
jority, but the right to say with impunity anything and everything
which any one chooses to say, and to speak it with impunity so long as
no actual material injury results to any one, and when it results then
to punish only for the contribution to that material injury and not
for the mere speech as such.
T. SCHROEDER, FREE SPEECH FOR RADICALS 20 (1916) (emphasis added); see
also 13 PAPERS OF THOmAS JEFFERSON 442 (J. Boyd ed. 1956) (declaration that
government will never restrain press from printing anything it pleases will not
take away potential liability).
These ideas are reflected in Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Bran-
denburg. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450-57 (1969) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Justice Douglas believed that no liability could be imposed on the
speech itself under the first amendment. Id. at 456-57. Under the proposed
standard, courts would not impose liability for the words, but for the material
injury that results. The plaintiff's burden of stating and proving the four ele-
ments of negligence, see supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text, would pre-
clude liability on words.
202. Courts have consistently failed to make the distinction between pun-
ishing or regulating speech as speech and imposing liability for harm caused by
speech. Cf Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1025-30 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) ("Tort liability would result after-the-fact, not as a prior re-
straint, and would be based on harm directly caused by the publication in
issue."). In their attempts to protect first amendment interests, the courts ap-
plying the categorical approach adopt a position that not only denies the inter-
ests of injured parties, but also denies ieal power to the first amendment.
Justice Stewart has stated:
No doubt the courts would be required to make some delicate judg-
ments in working out this accommodation. But that, after all, is the
function of courts of law. Better such judgments, however difficult,
than the simplistic and stultifying absolutism adopted by the Court
in denying any force to the First Amendment in these cases.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 745-46 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added).
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potential defendants guidance in planning their conduct.
20 3
The lack of guidance would have a chilling effect on media
speech, resulting in prior restraints as a result of self-censor-
ship.20 4 All negligence cases, however, involve case-by-case
analyses of the particular facts20 5 and are subject to the criti-
cism that they provide inadequate guidance to potential defend-
ants. Nonetheless, bridge builders, automobile drivers, pilots,
and others whose activities inherently create risk continue to
function. 20 6 Moreover, the negligence requirement of foresee-
ability of harm provides guidance not only to potential defend-
ants in planning their actions 20 7 but also to potential media
defendants in planning their speech.20 8 For example, the re-
quirement of foreseeability would guide the media in determin-
ing whether to give warnings against duplicating depicted
203. See M. NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.02, at 10 (1984).
204. See, e.g., Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 494, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 892 (fear
of damages may be more inhibiting than fear of prosecution under criminal
statute) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964)).
205. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
206. The mere fact that cars are driven, bridges are built, planes are flown,
and all the other occurrences of daily activity take place is evidence that fear
of negligence liability does not paralyze activity. Media defendants should be
no less able to foresee and protect against risk than any other potential de-
fendant. Without the balancing of the value of the conduct and the interests
to be protected, any imposition of liability would tend to reduce activity,
whether the activity be that of the media or anyone else. The protections of-
fered by balancing the interests, see supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text,
however, acknowledge that the utility of some activity outweighs the risks cre-
ated. The same balancing will work for media defendants, particularly consid-
ering that the risk must be foreseeable by a reasonable person.
207. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. The requirement that a
risk be foreseeable by a reasonable person gives guidance to potential defend-
ants and allows them to tailor their actions to conform to the legal standards.
If the risk is not foreseeable, the actor will be excused from liability because
he had no duty or because the action was not a proximate or legal cause of the
harm. See supra note 21.
208. Media defendants, like any other group or class of defendants, would
be called upon merely to recognize that their actions may lead to harm and
determine what, if any, protective measures are necessary or possible. Because
of the strong implications of the first amendment, liability in many instances
would not be allowed because no duty could be found. In cases such as Herceg,
see supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text, DeFilippo, see supra notes 112-
13 and accompanying text, and Shannon, see supra notes 108-09 and accompa-
nying text, the media could easily give warnings of the dangers involved. Ju-
ries would have the responsibility of determining the adequacy of the
warnings. See supra note 188. Cases like Olivia N., see supra notes 110-11 and
accompanying text, would probably continue to be dismissed because the util-
ity of the conduct in terms of the first amendment outweighs the risk. See
supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
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conduct.20 9 Imposing liability would have the salutary effect of
encouraging the media to include such warnings.
Chilling effects on actions in general, however, are of less
concern than chilling effects on speech because of the special
place that speech occupies among constitutional protections.2 10
Nevertheless, in defamation cases courts apply negligence stan-
dards2 11 without significantly chilling speech. The proposed
negligence standard for speech merely would require the media
to exercise ordinary care with respect to the foreseeable risks
of physical injury just as the media must exercise ordinary care
with respect to the truth of their statements.21
Furthermore, in cases in which a duty analysis might not
be successful in protecting against imposition of liability that
improperly would chill other speech, the courts could rely on
proximate cause213 to protect future speech. For example, in a
case such as Olivia N.,214 a court might decide that a duty ex-
ists, but that liability would chill creative speech. The court
would then conclude that, as a policy matter, the proximate
cause element had not been satisfied. In applying proximate
cause principles, courts should carefully analyze the potential
for actual chilling effects, rather than rely on unsupported alle-
gations that liability would chill speech.2 15
209. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (first
amendment occupies preferred place).
211. See supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text. Courts apply negligence
standards whether they so state, or even recognize, that they are doing so. See
supra note 158.
212. See supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
214. 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888; see supra notes 110-11 and ac-
companying text.
215. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, § 30, at 165-69. Courts should
specifically state how and why liability would chill speech and carefully distin-
guish the facts from similar cases.
Another potential problem in imposing negligence liability on the media is
the extended liability exposure possible when publications or broadcasts, espe-
cially in the modem world of video recorders, lie dormant for some time
before any harm is caused. This was one of the concerns when the strict poli-
cies of product liability law were developing, especially in light of the fact that
statutes of limitations do not begin to run until injury occurs or is discovered.
Id. at 165-66. Thus, defendants could be held liable for injuries arising years
after the manufacture or sale of their product, or in the present question, after
their publication or broadcast. Product liability law has solved this problem,
to some extent at least, through the adoption of "statutes of repose," which,
although constitutionally questionable, limit liability to a fixed period after
production or sale. See id. at 168. Similar standards could be adopted for po-
tential media defendants to protect them from potential time bombs. Alterna-
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Courts engaging in needed change of the law often must
adopt principles that are not delineated easily at first.
Although flexibility may create difficulties in applying new
rules, it allows courts to avoid mistakes resulting from applica-
tion of rigid but unsound rules.216 This Note's suggested ap-
proach will allow courts to analyze duty carefully, on a case-by-
case basis to avoid the unsupported imposition of liability that
has occurred under some courts' prior analyses.217 Courts also
should apply the suggested standards more carefully than some
courts have applied traditional categorical principles to disallow
recovery by plaintiffs physically injured as the result of negli-
gent use of words.218 The past imprecision of the courts, result-
ing from unwillingness to distinguish the cases factually and
balance the competing interests, should not continue to bar in-
jured plaintiffs from receiving just compensation for physical
injury resulting from another's negligent use of words.
CONCLUSION
Courts in recent years have faced an increasing number of
suits brought by physically injured plaintiffs alleging negligent
use of words by media defendants. These plaintiffs have gone
largely uncompensated because of courts' excessive concern for
protecting freedom of speech. Applying the categorical analysis
of identifying protected and unprotected speech under the first
amendment, courts have refused to impose civil liability for
protected but negligent speech. A few courts have allowed
tively, courts could invoke the concept of proximate cause to avoid imposing
liability after the passage of a reasonable time. See supra notes 19-21 and ac-
companying text.
216. For example, recognition of new torts often meets the criticism that
no standards exist for potential defendants. See Hubbard v. United Press Int'l,
330 N.W.2d 428, 437-39 (Minn. 1983) (adopting intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress as independent tort and rejecting concerns that potential de-
fendants would have no guidance, that frivolous claims would result, and that
judicial process would be abused); see also supra note 103.
217. See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text. To shift from con-
clusory judgments against recovery to conclusory judgments allowing recovery
would be more damaging than the present tendency. The first amendment
protections may not extend to all of the cases discussed in this Note, but free
speech deserves strong protection, and only a case-by-case analysis and atten-
tion to the specific factual situations will protect free speech and at the same
time afford plaintiffs a reasonable expectation of protection from or compensa-
tion for harm.
218. See supra notes 107-46 and accompanying text. The conclusory judg-
ments of the courts applying the categorical approach rob the first amendment
of any real force. See supr note 217.
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plaintiffs to recover in negligence but have not adequately ana-
lyzed first amendment issues.
A better approach would be to apply traditional negligence
principles to these cases of physical injury caused by negligent
use of words and to bring the first amendment interests into
this analysis. Courts should focus on the foreseeable risks and
actual harm arising from the speech and the utility of the
speech rather than on the category of the speech. To determine
whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, courts
should determine the utility of the speech on a case-by-case ba-
sis by reference to the values underlying the first amendment
and then should weigh the utility of the speech against the
magnitude of the foreseeable risk created. Courts should also
carefully examine the issue of causation and apply principles of
proximate cause to limit liability when an immediate potential
exists for a chilling effect on speech. Approaching negligent
use of words cases in this manner would lead to more just re-
sults, allowing plaintiffs to recover in narrowly prescribed cir-
cumstances, while at the same time providing proper protection
of free speech.
Gerald R. Smith
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